The defendant, Lesley Blades, was convicted in the Warren District Court of driving under the influence, second offense. His conviction was affirmed on appeal by the Warren Circuit Court. The Kentucky Court of Appeals denied Blades' motion for discretionary review. The Kentucky Supreme Court then granted Blades' motion for discretionary review and, in a four to three opinion, affirmed his conviction.

The DUI charge arose out of the following facts. Blades and his stepdaughter had spent the day at the Dueling Grounds Racetrack. Blades became intoxicated while there so he asked his stepdaughter to drive him home. Blades' truck developed a problem on the way home. Blades left his truck, with the motor running and the flashers on, in the middle of the road and began walking in search of assistance. Two Kentucky State Troopers found Blades staggering down the road. Blades smelled strongly of alcohol and failed several field sobriety tests. He was arrested for public intoxication. The troopers then found Blades' truck about one mile down the road. Blades admitted he had driven the truck to its present location. Blades was charged with DUI, second offense.

At trial, Blades testified he was not telling the truth when he told the troopers he had been driving the truck. He said he had lied to protect his stepdaughter who was married. Blades' step-daughter testified she had driven the truck home from the racetrack. Both Blades and his step-daughter testified that after the truck began to malfunction she caught a ride with a passing car in an effort to get help. Another witness testified he had helped a woman start a truck in the race track parking lot because she was not familiar with diesel trucks, and that Blades was a passenger in the truck.

On appeal, Blades raised the following four issues.

First, Blades argued he was entitled to an instruction on public intoxication. Since trial counsel had never asked the trial court to instruct the jury on public intoxication, the Kentucky Supreme Court held this issue was not preserved for review and it failed to address the merits of this allegation of error.

Second, Blades argued that the circuit court should have reversed his conviction because the Commonwealth failed to file a brief or respond to Blades' appeal. The Kentucky Supreme Court held there is no rule requiring automatic reversal where the appellee fails to file an appellate brief, thus Blades' argument was without merit.

Third, Blades argued he was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal since there was no evidence he was driving the truck other than his out of court uncorroborated confession to the troopers. Blades relied on Pence v. Commonwealth, 825 S.W.2d 282 (Ky.App. 1991) to support his argument.

The Kentucky Supreme Court distinguished Pence on its facts. It then overruled Pence because it "require[d] a greater degree of certainty in DUI cases than is required in other areas of the law." RCr 9.60 provides that a confession, unless made in open court, will not warrant a conviction unless accompanied by other proof that such an offense was committed. The Court stated that the proof required to corroborate the out of court confession "may be established by considering the confession as well as the corroborating evidence." The Court concluded that the circumstantial evidence in the case sufficed to corroborate Blades' confession; and the circumstantial evidence and the confession taken together were sufficient to overcome the directed verdict motion.

The dissent argued the circumstantial evidence was not sufficient to corroborate the out of court confession. It stated "[t]here must be proof that the crime was committed to corroborate the out of court confession," and there was no proof of a crime without Blades' statement. Thus, Blades' statement should not have been admitted at trial because it was uncorroborated. [It does not appear from the opinion that the introduction of the out of court confession was ever challenged or objected to. The dissent would have reversed Blades' conviction due to the insufficiency of the evidence.

Fourth, Blades argued he was entitled to a new trial because the trial court did not bifurcate the guilt phase from the penalty phase of his trial. Although this argument was not preserved for review, either at trial or on appeal to the circuit court, the Kentucky Supreme Court pointed out that in 1994, which was when Blades' trial occurred, there was no constitutional or statutory requirement for bifurcation of misdemeanor DUI trials.

Conley was convicted of first degree burglary in the Rowan Circuit Court and sentenced to fifteen years in the penitentiary. The Court of Appeals reversed Conley's conviction because the circuit judge had ordered Conley to wear leg shackles during the trial. The Commonwealth moved for discretionary review which the Supreme Court granted.

The Commonwealth framed the issue as "whether repeated and forceful admonitions to the jury to disregard the shackles, together with overwhelming evidence of guilt, negates any possible prejudice to the defendant." [The dissent pointed out there was not overwhelming evidence of guilt since there were no eyewitnesses and no physical evidence linking Conley to the charged offense. The Commonwealth's case was based on the testimony of admitted drug users who collaborated on their stories before going to the police and who admitted tampering with evidence.]

Conley framed the issue as "whether the trial judge denied him due process and a fair trial by requiring him to be tried in shackles."

The Kentucky Supreme Court framed the issue as "whether the circuit judge abused his discretion in ordering Conley to be shackled throughout the trial."

The facts of the case are as follows. Conley was charged with burglary involving the theft of a firearm. At arraignment, before the ultimate trial judge on that charge, he escaped from the courtroom and fled the courthouse. Prior to trial, the judge, sua sponte, ordered Conley be shackled during the trial. The judge admonished the jury several times to the effect that Conley was presumed innocent and the jury was not to take into consideration that Conley was under restraint.

The trial judge determined Conley's escape at arraignment presented a security risk that required drastic action. The judge considered bringing in several state troopers for the trial, but decided, over Conley's objection, that leg irons would be less prejudicial than having Conley surrounded by several police officers. This conclusion is directly contradicted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 569 (1986), which holds the use of extra guards to ensure safety and reduce risk of flight is less prejudicial that shackling.

Although the Kentucky Supreme Court "has long held that the practice of shackling a defendant during trial is to be condemned," it has also recognized that "the use of shackles...has been necessary in cases where the trial court appears to have encountered some good grounds for believing such defendants might attempt to do violence or to escape...." Ultimately, the matter "rests in the 'sound and reasonable discretion' of the trial judge."

The Supreme Court, in a four to three opinion, held the record in the case at bar demonstrates that the trial judge carefully considered all the available alternatives with regard to security in the courtroom. He thoroughly examined and admonished prospective jurors about the presumption of innocence and its relationship to the restraints. The Supreme Court held there was "nothing to indicate that the jury that was ultimately selected was unduly prejudiced." Thus, the trial judge exercised his discretion "within the bounds of legal propriety."

Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the Court of Appeals and reinstated Conley's conviction.

Maddox was charged with the murder of Terrance Davis, the two year old son of his live in girlfriend. A jury found him guilty of first degree manslaughter and sentenced him to sixteen years imprisonment.

The Court of Appeals reversed Maddox' conviction because it held the trial court erred when it limited Maddox' cross-examination of two prosecution witnesses: Michelle Davis, Terrance's mother, and Michael Stewart, Michelle's brother, who had been present in Michelle's home on the night the fatal incident occurred. The excluded evidence, which was put into the record by avowal, showed that one month prior to Terrance's death Michelle Davis had struck one of her sister's children so hard that a shoe imprint had been left on the child. This information was substantiated by the Cabinet for Human Resources' investigation and Michelle admitted having struck the child. The avowal evidence also showed that Michael Stewart had sexually molested another child in Michelle's care. This information was also substantiated by CHR's investigation.

The Commonwealth moved for discretionary review which was granted by the Supreme Court.

The Kentucky Supreme Court, pointing out that "trial courts retain broad discretion to regulate cross-examination," reversed the opinion of the Court of Appeals.

The Court held that Michelle's prior bad act bore no similarity to those that were inflicted on Terrance on the night of his death and thus it was not a proper subject for cross-examination. The medical evidence at trial showed that Terrance had a massive skull fracture and a ruptured blood vessel in his abdomen and died from these injuries. The Court also held that Michael's sexual abused of another child was not so similar to the crime committed to make it admissible to prove identity or modus operandi under KRE 404(b)(1).

Maddox had also challenged the trial court's admission of all thirteen autopsy photographs. The Court of Appeals held the trial court had not erred in admitting the photographs. Maddox raised this issue on cross-appeal in the Kentucky Supreme Court. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the autopsy photographs were not so gruesome as to require exclusion.

In a unanimous opinion, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the Court of Appeals and reinstated Maddox' conviction.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether KRS 532.110(4), which states that a sentence imposed pursuant to a conviction for escape shall run consecutively with any other sentence the defendant must serve, creates an exception to the sentencing cap set forth in KRS 532.110(1)(c). The Kentucky Supreme Court held that it does. The Court stated that KRS 532.110(4) mandates consecutive sentencing for escape offenses and modifies the sentencing maximum set out in KRS 532.110(1)(c).

Weaver was convicted of first degree trafficking in a controlled substance, cocaine, after selling cocaine to a police informant. Weaver was also convicted of being a PFO II and he was sentenced to twenty years. Weaver raised five issues on his appeal.

Weaver's first argument concerns the sufficiency of the evidence. The Commonwealth's case was based on the testimony of the informant who sold the cocaine to Weaver. On cross-examination, the informant denied he had been involved in any other drug sting operations for the Franklin City Police Department. However, the police detective involved in the case testified the informant had been involved in other police sting operations. Thus, Weaver argued that since the informant committed perjury, his entire trial testimony must be disregarded. Without the informant's testimony, there was no evidence to support a conviction.

The Kentucky Supreme Court disagreed. The Court held the informant's perjured testimony went only to a collateral issue: how many other sting operations he had been involved in. This testimony affected the informant's credibility but it did not directly affect the facts of the case. Thus, there were no grounds to strike the informant's testimony, and the evidence was sufficient to support Weaver's trafficking conviction.

Weaver's second argument concerns the Commonwealth's violation of the trial court's discovery order. The sale of the cocaine to the informant occurred in Weaver's car. Three other individuals were present in Weaver's car at the time. The informant did not inform the police of this fact in his written statement made immediately after the sale.

Pursuant to the court's discovery order, the Commonwealth was required to provide Weaver with the names and addresses of those persons present during the commission of the charged offense. The Commonwealth made no objection to the court's order and responded that only Weaver and the informant were present.

At trial, the informant testified three other people were in the car. The informant provided the name of one of the three individuals but denied knowing the other two persons. Defense counsel did not ask for a continuance to locate the named individual or make any other motions at that time. However, at the conclusion of the Commonwealth's case, on the second day of trial, counsel moved for a mistrial due to the Commonwealth's violation of the discovery order.

The Kentucky Supreme Court stated that although withholding the identity of an eyewitness would ordinarily prejudice the defendant's ability to prepare his defense, under the facts of the instant case no prejudice occurred because the named individual was available to be interviewed by defense counsel, but he failed to do so. During the discussion on the mistrial motion, defense counsel admitted he had not made any effort to contact the named individual. Weaver and the court both stated the individual was in the local jail, and counsel admitted he had been in the jail the previous evening but had not talked to the individual. Because defense counsel did not avail himself of the opportunity to talk to the individual, the Supreme Court held Weaver could not then claim on appeal that he was prejudiced by the Commonwealth's violation of the discovery order.

Weaver's third argument concerns the limitation of his cross-examination of the police detective as to the informant's participation in other sting operations. As previously stated, the information perjured himself when he denied his involvement in other sting operations. The detective acknowledged the informant's involvement in other sting operations, but could not recall the exact number. As to the total amount the informant had been paid by the police for his involvement, the detective was not sure but believed it was less than $500.00. Defense counsel moved the court to compel the detective to provide the specific information, but the court reused.

The Kentucky Supreme Court held the trial court's ruling was not reversible error because the detective "gave the jury enough information to permit a fair appraisal of [the informant's] bias. The trial judge's ruling was a reasonable limitation on this exploration into [the informant's] motive or bias."

Weaver's fourth argument concerns the so-called "police surveillance privilege." On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned the detective about the type of recording device used to record the drug buy. Counsel wanted to show because of the nature of the recording device, the informant was able to affect the audibility of the recording, which was essential to Weaver's defense tat the transaction never occurred, but was just a way for the informant to get $50.00 "snitch" money from the police. The Commonwealth objected to the question and the trial court sustained the objection on the basis of the so-called "police surveillance privilege" recognized by the Court of Appeals in Jett v. Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Ky.App. 1993). Counsel moved the court to compel him to respond, but the court refused.

The Kentucky Supreme Court held that Kentucky does not recognize the "police surveillance privilege" and overruled Jett, supra, on this point. The Court held that any error in suppressing testimony about the nature of the recording device was harmless because the detective admitted the informant could have intentionally affected the operation of the recording device so as to prevent it from producing an audible recording of the transaction. Thus, the defense actually received the requested information.

Weaver's fifth argument concerns comments by the prosecutor in his closing argument. The prosecutor told the jury that the Commonwealth's evidence was "uncontroverted" and "undisputed" and there was no evidence presented that Weaver did not sell the cocaine to the informant. After the jury had gone out to deliberate, defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on the prosecutor's repeated references to the "uncontradicted evidence."

The Kentucky Supreme Court held this argument was not properly preserved for review by a contemporaneous objection. However, even if the objection had been timely made, the Court held there was no error because the comments went to Weaver's failure to refute the informant's testimony "by any means." They did not address themselves directly to Weaver's silence.

In a six to one opinion, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed Weaver's convictions.

Robert Wolbrecht was shot and killed on Sep-tember 1, 1985. Seven and one half years later, on March 2, 1993, his widow Peggy and Arthur Feakins and Bobby Taylor were indicted for complicity to murder. The indictment alleged that one of the three named indictees was the actual shooter.

Prior to trial, Bobby Taylor's trial was severed from the trial of his coindictees.

Peggy and Arthur's trial began on January 24, 1995. On the fifth day of trial, and during the testimony of its next to last witness, the Commonwealth moved to amend the indictment. Over defense counsels' objection, the trial court granted the Commonwealth's motion and overruled the defendants' motion for a continuance. The amended indictment, rather than alleging that one of the named indictees actually pulled the trigger, simply alleged that the victim was shot and killed without alleging that one of the three named indictees actually pulled the trigger, thus enlarging the basis for the defendants' conviction.

Peggy and Arthur were convicted of complicity to murder and the jury fixed each of their punishment at twenty years imprisonment.

On appeal the Kentucky Supreme Court addressed two issues: whether the trial court erred when it granted the Commonwealth's motion to amend the indictment; and whether it erred when it failed to grant the defense a continuance to meet the new allegation in the expanded indictment.

In a four to three opinion, the Kentucky Supreme Court held the trial court's granting of the Commonwealth's motion to amend the indictment "to include some unknown killer was a substantive change which prejudiced both [defendants'] substantial rights" and constituted reversible error. "When the Commonwealth failed to prove, as charged in the original indictment, that Wolbrecht, Feakins or Taylor actually shot and killed Robert [Wolbrecht], the trial court improperly allowed an amendment to encompass a new charge - that either Feakins or Wolbrecht helped someone, anyone, or everyone to murder Robert. They were unduly and unfairly surprised near the conclusion of the Commonwealth's case with a new charge that they each had engaged in a conspiracy with some anonymous co-conspirator to murder Robert Wolbrecht."

The Supreme Court also held the defendants were further harmed when the trial court failed to grant their motion for a continuance. Once the indictment was amended, "the defense should have been given the opportunity, by way of a continuance, to analyze its case anew and prepare a defense based upon the broadened theory now presented by the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth had more than nine years to get it right, but the appellants had only three days to ascertain further alibis." The Court referred to the appellants as having been "ambushed" at trial.

The Court reversed the appellants' convictions and remanded for a new trial.

Moseley was convicted of wanton murder and sentenced to twenty eight years imprisonment based on the death of his live-in girlfriend. Moseley's defense was the shooting was an accident, while the Commonwealth's theory was Moseley had a history of physically abusing his wife.

To prove its theory of the case, the Commonwealth called three witnesses during its case in chief who testified the victim told them that Moseley had stabbed her in the leg on the day before her death as well as physically abused her on dates six months prior to her death. In rebuttal, the Commonwealth called three additional witnesses who testified the victim had told them of incidents when Moseley had beaten her up.

On appeal, Moseley argued the above-mentioned testimony was improperly admitted because it was hearsay and did not fall within any exception to the hearsay rule.

The Commonwealth admitted the statements were hearsay (out of court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted), but maintained they were admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule in KRE 803(3) to prove Moseley's state of mind.

The Kentucky Supreme Court recognized that KRE 803(3) applies to the declarant's state of mind, i.e., the victim in this case, not the defendant's, as the Commonwealth argued. Since the victim's state of mind at the time of her death was not in issue, the statements were not admissible under the KRE 803(3) exception. Finding no other applicable exception to the hearsay rule that would provide for the admission of the victim's out of court statements, the Court held, in a four to three opinion, the statements were improperly admitted and reversed Moseley's conviction for a new trial.

The Court addressed an additional hearsay problem in the case to prevent its reoccurrence at retrial.

A police detective (Cain) testified Moseley gave four inconsistent statements as to how the shooting occurred. However, these statements were not made to Cain, but to four different members of the fire department. These four inconsistent statements were told to Cain by one of the firemen and a police officer who did not testify.

Moseley argued Cain's testimony was inadmissible "investigative hearsay." The Supreme Court held Moseley's four inconsistent statements were admissible as admissions under KRE 801A(b)(1) and could be introduced through the testimony of the individuals to whom they were made. At the retrial, Det. Cain should not be permitted to repeat the statements during his testimony.

Mullins' wife found him engaged in acts of sodomy with a fourteen year old babysitter. She telephoned the police from a neighbor's home and gave testimony against her husband at the grand jury. By the time of trial, Mullins and his wife claimed the husband wife privilege. The trial court ruled the wife waived her privilege by giving statements concerning the incident and that Mullins had waived the privilege by waiting until trial to assert it.

Mullins was convicted of third degree sodomy and sentenced to four years imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction on the ground that under KRS 620.050 (2) the husband wife privilege is not applicable in a criminal proceeding regarding a dependent, neglected or abused child. Mullins moved for discretionary review which the Kentucky Supreme Court granted.

The Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the Court of Appeals and stated: "It is the holding of this Court that pursuant to KRS 620.050, the husband and wife privilege does not apply to testimony in a criminal trial involving dependent, neglected and abused children."

Mullins also argued on appeal that it was reversible error for the victim's mother to testify the victim was placed in a psychiatric ward of a hospital after the incident, and that it was error to introduce evidence that the victim has been receiving counseling treatment from a psychiatrist and a counselor.

The Kentucky Supreme Court held the complained of testimony was relevant to whether the victim consented to the acts. Thus, there was no error in the admission of the testimony.

Mullins' conviction was affirmed.

Stringer was convicted of three counts of first degree sodomy and two counts of first degree sexual abuse. The victim of Stringer's actions was a nine year old girl. Multiple issues were raised on appeal.

First, Stringer challenged the sufficiency of the evidence because the victim failed to testify to specific dates and times when the sexual acts occurred. The Kentucky Supreme Court held the Commonwealth's failure to prove the specific dates of the offenses was of no consequence since the dates of the offenses were not a material ingredient of the offenses. The Commonwealth proved the child was less than twelve years of age at the time the offenses occurred and that was the only relevant time element necessary to support the convictions.

Second, Stringer argued it was error to allow the victim to testify from the circuit court library via closed circuit television. Stringer was present in the library with the victim, while the jury was in the courtroom. The Supreme Court held there was no authority to support Stringer's position that a witness and the jury must be in the same room during the witness' testimony.

Stringer also argued it was error to allow the victim to use anatomically correct dolls while describing the acts perpetrated upon her by Stringer. The Supreme Court found nothing improper with this procedure.

Third, Stringer argued it was error to allow the victim's mother to testify that when she told the victim Stringer would bring her home from the day care center the following day, the victim responded, "Please don't make me ride with him." The Court held this statement was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The statement had a legitimate nonhearsay use which was to prove the victim was afraid of Stringer. Thus, the testimony was properly admitted.

Stringer also argued it was error for the prosecutor to ask the victim's mother whether someone had told her the victim had been sexually abused. The mother testified the victim was the one who told her about the abuse. The

Supreme Court held there was no error in this line of questioning because it related to why the victim was referred to Mr. House (a certified psychological counselor and cognitive therapist) and was not dependent upon the truthfulness of whether the victim had been abused. The testimony had a legitimate nonhearsay use and was thus admissible.

Fourth, Stringer argued it was error to permit Mr. House to give hearsay testimony by repeating statements made to him by the victim describing the sexual abuse and identifying Stringer as the perpetrator. The Supreme Court held this testimony was properly admitted under KRE 803(4) because the statements were made for the purpose of treatment or diagnosis related to the cause or external source of the child's symptoms.

Stringer also argued it was error for House to express his belief in the truthfulness of the victim's allegations of sexual abuse and that this testimony invaded the province of the jury. House testified that although he was initially concerned the victim might have been "coached," he subsequently found the child's responses "consistent" and supported by "internal logic," and "[he] felt that [he] trusted [the victim] -- or the veracity of the statements and so forth."

Although the Supreme Court pointed out a witness may not vouch for the truthfulness of another witness, it noted there was no contemporaneous objection to any of the statements.

Two separate dissenting opinions found House's opinion testimony as to the victim's credibility to be improper and noted the prosecutor admitted House's testimony was being offered to establish the veracity of the victim's statement.

Stringer also argued it was error for the trial judge to refuse to require House to produce his office records regarding his treatment of the victim. Since the records had not been subpoenaed and House testified from memory, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to order House to retrieve them from his office and bring them to the courthouse for perusal by the defense.

Fifth, Stringer argued it was error (improper opinion testimony on the ultimate issue) for Dr. Nunemaker to testify that his findings, which revealed some tearing in the victim's vaginal area as well as some stretching and partial destruction of the hymen, "were compatible with [the victim's] history that she had given [him]" and with "something being inserted in there, and, trying to stretch it."

The Supreme Court held Dr. Nunemaker's testimony was not improperly admitted. Since the doctor's testimony would assist the jury in understanding the evidence and determining a fact in issue, it was admissible under KRE 702. The Court stated that in a criminal case, the ultimate fact in issue is whether the defendant is guilty. "Whether the physical findings testified to by Dr. Nunemaker were consistent with sexual abuse is only a relevant evidentiary fact tending to make the ultimate fact more or less probable. KRE 401."

The Court went on to hold that "[e]xpert opinion evidence is admissible so long as (1) the witness is qualified to render an opinion on the subject matter, (2) the subject matter satisfies the requirements of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), (3) the subject matter satisfies the test of relevancy set forth in KRE 401..., and (4) the opinion with assist the trier of fact per KRE 702." The Court then overruled Brown v. Commonwealth, 812 S.W.2d 502 (Ky. 1991) and Alexander v. Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d 856 (Ky. 1993), insofar as they hold otherwise.

The Court concluded that Dr. Nunemaker's opinion concerned a subject peculiarly within the knowledge of a trained physician and was likely to assist the jury in determining whether [the victim] had been sexually abused by [Stringer]."

Once again, both dissenting opinions found the admission of Dr. Nunemaker's testimony to be error. One opinion concluded the error was harmless, while the other would have reversed Stringer's convictions. Both dissenting opinions also pointed out the Kentucky Supreme Court had specifically refused to adopt FRE 704, a rule allowing expert opinion testimony upon the ultimate issue, and believed the majority opinion was improperly amending the Kentucky Rules of Evidence contrary to the express provisions of KRE 1102 and 1103.

Sixth, Stringer argued the trial court improperly suppressed four different pieces of evidence. Stringer had sought to introduce handwritten notes about the victim's behavior contained in records prepared by a previous owner of the daycare center. The Court held the trial court did not err by excluding the notes because evidence of the victim's character for criminal sexual conduct is generally inadmissible under KRE 404(a)(2), and the evidence did not qualify for any of the recognized exceptions.

Stringer also sought to introduce testimony from a clinical psychologist about the suggestibility of children, proper procedures in interviewing children and the appropriate standard of practice in child sexual abuse cases. Since the psychologist had not interviewed the victim in this case and since the victim interviews were not audio or video taped, the Court held this testimony was properly excluded as being speculative and irrelevant.

Stringer also sought to introduce testimony from the mother of another child of Stringer's alleged abuse who would have testified she did not approve of the manner wi which the social workers interviewed her daughter. Since the witness had no background to qualify her to render such an opinion, her testimony was properly excluded.

Lastly, Stringer sought to introduce testimony from the father of another child suspected of having been abused by Stringer that he was of the opinion that the social workers were already convinced of Stringer's guilt. Since no social worker rendered an opinion as to Stringer's guilt, such testimony was properly excluded as irrelevant.

Stringer's convictions were affirmed.

Yates was found guilty of murder and giving a false name to a police officer. He was sentenced to the maximum of life imprisonment for the murder and ninety days for giving a false name.

The sole issue raised on appeal concerns the trial court's failure to suppress statements from a police officer which were not included in his written report.

During the Commonwealth's opening statement, the prosecutor stated a police officer would testify he had seen Yates at a location west of the murder scene prior to Yates' arrest. Up until this time, the only information the defense had received from the Commonwealth was the officer's report stating Yates had been arrested at a location east of the murder scene, and the murder weapon had been found west of the murder scene. Yates' planned defense was the police could not place him in the vicinity of murder weapon. However, trial counsel made no objection to the prosecutor's opening statement.

During the testimony of the Officer Pinnegar, the Commonwealth's fifth witness, defense counsel asked the court to limit the officer's testimony to what he had recorded in his written report. The trial court expressed concern over Yates request and expressed the issue as whether the Commonwealth had any obligation, once it determined that a witness's written statement was incomplete, to reveal the rest of the information to the defense. Despite the trial court's concern, it denied Yates' request to prevent the officer from testifying to the additional information.

The Kentucky Supreme Court stated it was "unable to find any rule or precedent which would require the Commonwealth to" voluntarily reveal the additional information to the defense. The Court further stated "[t]here is no authority that would require a trial judge to confine a witness's testimony to the four corners of his or her written statement. The dissent pointed out that RCr 7.24(9) grants the trial court ample authority to correct the error, and it would have reversed for a new trial.

The Court also questioned the materiality of Yates' argument because trial counsel did not object when the prosecutor first revealed the additional information in opening statement and did not ask for a continuance when he finally did object during the testimony of the Commonwealth's fifth witness. Also, counsel effectively cross-examined Officer Pinnegar about his failure to supplement his written report.

Finding no error in the trial court's ruling, the Supreme Court, in a four to three opinion, affirmed Yates' conviction.
 

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